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Sanders: Poe v. Gerstein

POE v. GERSTEIN
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PRIVACY-Minor's right to an
abortion-Statutoryrequirement of spousal consent, or parental
consent in the case of an unmarried, minor female, is an unconstitutionaldeprivation of a woman's right to determine whether
to undergo an abortion. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
In Poe v. Gerstein,' the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the right of privacy which protects a woman's decision of
whether to terminate her pregnancy applied to minor, unmarried
females, as well as to married women. As a result, the court found
unconstitutional a Florida law which required spousal consent, or
parental consent in the case of a minor, unmarried female, before
a therapeutic abortion could be legally obtained. This application
of the right of privacy will relieve many women from the deprivation they have previously suffered. Nevertheless, the court's approach in regard to the minor's rights fails to provide an appropriate analysis for the resolution of the issues involved.
Seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, three physicians
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida. Two pregnant women-one married, the other
a minor-were permitted to intervene as plaintiffs. The complaint challenged the constitutionality of two provisions of the
Florida Therapeutic Abortion Act 2 which required parental consent in the case of a pregnant minor, and consent of a pregnant
married woman's husband before an abortion could be performed.'

1. 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975).
2. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.22(3) (Supp. 1975-76). The statute provides:
WRTINGCS REQuIRED-One

of the following shall be obtained by the physician

prior to terminating a pregnancy:
(a) The written request of the pregnant woman and, if she is married, the
written consent of her husband, unless the husband is voluntarily living apart
from the wife, or
(b) If the pregnant woman is under eighteen years of age and unmarried,
in addition to her written request, the written consent of a parent, custodian or
legal guardian must be obtained ....
The statute did include a provision that discarded the consent requirements of § 458.22(3)
in the case of medical necessity, provided that the attending physician obtains at least
one corroborative medical opinion attesting to the medical necessity for emergency medical procedures and to the fact that to a reasonable degree of medical
certainty the continuation of the pregnancy would threaten the life of the pregnant woman.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.22(3)(c).
3. The plaintiffs also challenged the constitutionality of FLA. STAT. ANN. § 458.22(2)
(1972) (limiting facilities where an abortion could be performed) and Division of Health
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A three-judge court convened pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 22814
held that both sections of the Florida statute were unconstitutional. The court refused to grant injunctive relief, however, and
assumed that "the defendants and other state officials charged
with enforcement of the invalidated statute and its derivative
rules [would] give full recognition" to the judgment.' Both parties appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court rejected the
plaintiffs' assertion that the denial of injunctive relief constituted
an abuse of discretion.' In a separate opinion, the Court dismissed
the defendants' appeal for want of jurisdiction and the appeal was
8
taken to the Fifth Circuit.
The Spousal Consent Requirement
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
found the statutory provisions requiring parental or spousal consent to be an unconstitutional deprivation of the minor's or married woman's fundamental right of privacy.' The State defended
the provision requiring the consent of the husband on two
grounds. It contended that such a regulation was "incidental to
Rules, ch. 10, D-65 (prohibiting advertisement by abortion facilities). The State did not
defend these provisions, admitting that they were invalid in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695, 696-97
(S.D. Fla. 1973).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964).
5. Coe v. Gerstein, 376 F. Supp. 695 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
6. Id. at 699.
7. Poe v. Gerstein, 417 U.S. 281 (1974). The Court held that the denial of injunctive
relief is proper in the absence of proof that the judgment would be disregarded. See
Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
8. Gerstein v. Coe, 417 U.S. 279 (1974). Jurisdiction was alleged under 28 U.S.C. §
1253 (1974) which authorizes direct appeal to the Supreme Court from judgments of threejudge courts. The Court held that it was without jurisdiction to consider the state's appeal
because section 1253 did not "authorize an appeal from the grant or denial of declaratory
relief alone." Gerstein v. Coe, 417 U.S. 279 (1974). The Court noted that the state could
appeal to the court of appeals, and that this course was, in fact, concurrently being
pursued. Id. at 279-80.
9. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1975). The potential impact of this decision
is broad. At least 15 states have incorporated spousal consent requirements for therapeutic
abortion. See, e.g., 4 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-305 (Cum. Supp. 1973); 4 IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18.609 (Cum. Supp. 1975); 23 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33 (D)(Cum. Supp. 1975); 7
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-682 (Cum. Supp. Ann. 1974). At least 18 states require parental
consent by statute for therapeutic abortion in the case of all or some minors. See, e.g., 4
ARK, STAT. ANN. § 41-305 (Cum. Supp. 1973); 6 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-105 (1973);
23 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.33(D)(Cum. Supp. 1975); 7 S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-683
(Cum. Supp. Ann. 1974). But see ALI, MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1962); UNIFORM ABORTION AcT (1971). These statutes make no mention of a husband's right to consent.
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its general authority to regulate the marriage relationship," and
that its enactment was necessary to protect the rights of husbands." The court found little substance in the first alleged interest of the State. While recognizing that the stability of society
and the general well-being of its citizens justify some state regulation of the marital relationship, the court concluded that these
interests were not sufficiently compelling to support interference
with a woman's constitutionally protected right to determine
whether to bear a child."
The second asserted interest, the protection of the rights of
a husband, presented a sharper conflict between competing interests. The court identified two broad interests that the father
might have in preventing an abortion: his paternal interest in the
fetus, and his interest in the procreative potential of the marriage. 2 Distinguishing a father's interest in a fetus from "his interest in children with whom he has a familial relationship,"' 3 the
court held that "the state interest in the husband's interest in the
fetus is simply too attenuated to strip the woman of her fundamental right to privacy."" The court rejected the assertion that
10. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795 (5th Cir. 1975).
11. Id. The Supreme Court has held that the states have authority to regulate the
marriage relationship, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); it has, however, since recognized that the marital union lies "within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). Therefore, if a state proposes to limit the right of a married woman to terminate her pregnancy,
it must be prepared to demonstrate that its reasons for doing so are compelling, for two
of the woman's fundamental rights are involved-the right to privacy surrounding her
marriage and her decision of whether to abort. The state's general interest in the stability
and well-being of its citizens, without more, is not substantial enough to interfere with
the enjoyment of these rights.
A different issue might arise if the state sought only to regulate who may marry.
Regulation of the formation of the marital union is far less intrusive than when, "having
acknowledged a marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, [the state] undertakes to
regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that intimacy." Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 553 (1961)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
But see Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D.
Mo. 1975)(three-judge court). Noting that "[ilt is difficult to see how marital harmony
could possibly be preserved if husbands were precluded from participating in decisions
which affect the very essence of the marriage relationship," the court held that "[tlhe
interest of the state in protecting the mutuality of decisions vital to the marriage relationship is compelling at all times during the marriage." Id. at 1370.
12. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1975).
13. 517 F.2d 787, 796 (5th Cir. 1975). Citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-58 (1973),
the Gerstein court noted that a fetus is not yet a child. Poe v. Gerstein, supra at 796.
14. Id. The statute required the husband's consent regardless of whether he was
actually the child's father. The court noted that the "statute . . . seems to base the
husband's interests upon his marriage to the woman rather than his paternity of the
fetus." Id.
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the legislation was necessary to safeguard the right of a husband
to procreate. It noted that the recognition of such a right presumes the presence of a willing partner; the Constitution safe5
guards the right of two consenting partners to procreate. It
does not, however, guarantee the realization of such a relationship. 6 If a wife is not willing to exercise her right to procreate,
the state may not compel her to do so by abridging her selfpossessed right to privacy. 7
The Parental Consent Requirement
The Gerstein court also found the statutory provision requiring parental consent to be an unconstitutional deprivation of the
minor's fundamental right to an abortion." It noted that seemingly inconsistent Supreme Court decisions have given rise to a
conflict regarding the extent of minors' constitutional rights. The
Court has held that minor students are "persons" under the Constitution'"-that neither the Bill of Rights nor the fourteenth
amendment is for adults alone.2" It has also held, however, that
the state's power to "control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults."' 21 The Court has
specifically declined to deal with the "totality of the relationship
of the minor and the State." 2
The Gerstein court limited its discussion to the specific right
at issue-the abortion decision. In Roe v. Wade2 the Supreme
15. In Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), the United States Supreme Court
held that the right to proceate was fundamental. In analyzing the nature of the right thus
protected, the court in Gerstein interpreted Skinner pragmatically: "Although Skinner
protected the individual's procreative rights, in practical terms these rights cannot be
exercised alone." Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 797 (5th Cir. 1975).
16. See Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128 (Mass. 1974). It was the husband's contention
that the United States Constitution guaranteed him the right to protect his issue from
being artifically aborted. The court surveyed the cases that might lend support to such a
right, and concluded that "[aill those cases involved a shield for the private citizen
against government action, not a sword of government assistance to enable him to overturn the private decisions of his fellow citizens." Id. at 130.
17. The court noted that there was a less restrictive means to secure the interests of
the husband-unconsented-to abortion may be made a ground for divorce. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 797 & n.21. (5th Cir. 1975).
18. Id. at 794.
19. Tinker v. Des Moines Community School, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); cf. Foe v.
Vanderhoof, 389 F. Supp. 947 (D. Colo. 1975). See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
20. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
21. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944). See also McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); S**** S.**** v. State, 299 A.2d 560 (Me. 1973).
22. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636 (1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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Court held that a woman's right to privacy limits the power of a
state to interfere with the decision to terminate a pregnancy. In
determining whether this limitation obtains when the decision is
to be made by a minor, the Gerstein court applied what it described as the "standard enunciated in Roe v. Wade-the need
for the right and the dire consequences of its denial ....
"I'
Noting that the consequences of a denial of this aspect of the right
of privacy are more harsh where the pregnant woman is a minor,
the court held that "the fundamental right to an abortion applies
to minors as well as adults."25 None of the state interests advanced in support of the parental consent requirement 26 was
found to be sufficiently compelling to justify the invasion of the
right, and the provision was held unconstitutional.
Although this note concurs with the court's holding regarding
the constitutionality of the parental consent provision, the analysis of the court is characterized by subtle inconsistencies with
existent legal principles and policy. In assessing the application
of such a right to minors, the initial premise, rather than the final
result, should be that minors possess the same fundamental privacy rights as adults, subject to limitation only if the state can
demonstrate a compelling interest.
The right to privacy, rooted in notions of liberty secured by
the common law27 as well as the Constitution of the United
States, 2 1 probably finds its most eloquent expression in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis in Olmstead v. United
States.29 The Justice explored the nature of the liberty thus guaranteed:30
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
24. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 791 (5th Cir. 1975).
25. Id.
26. The court identified four arguable state interests: "(a) preventing illicit sexual
conduct among minors; (b) protecting minors from their own improvidence; (c) fostering
parental control; [and] (d) supporting the family as a social unit." Id. at 792.
27. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
28. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
29. 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928)(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 478.
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the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To
protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means
employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
1 a landmark in the development
In Griswold v. Connecticut,"
of the right to privacy, the constitutional bases of the right were
greatly expanded. The Court found that the enumerated constitutional guarantees necessarily imply the existence of other
rights:3"

[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance.... Various guarantees create zones
of privacy.

The Gerstein court cited Roe v. Wade for the proposition that
the scope of the right of privacy is to be determined by reference
to the consequences of its denial. In evaluating an assertion that
a particular interest or activity is protected by the right, the
Supreme Court has never embraced this approach.13 The Court
in Roe v. Wade purported neither to conceive nor apply such a
standard. The Court found that the right to privacy was "broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, ' 3 not because the need for the right satisfied
a standard, but because the Court deemed the interests involved
"'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' ,,3'
31. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
32. Id. at 484. The Court found the right of privacy to emanate from the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. Id. See id. at 486-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 499 (Alaska
1975).
33. Compare Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
34. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
35. Id. at 152, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
The analysis used by the Court in Roe to determine whether the abortion decision
was protected by the right to privacy is ambiguous at best. The Court first discussed the
constitutional provisions which have been cited as sources of the privacy right and
adopted the "Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon
state action." Id. at 152-53. The Court stressed that "only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in
this guarantee of personal privacy." Id. at 152. It then held that the right of privacy
encompasses a woman's decision of whether to terminate her pregnancy. Id. at 153. Various examples were offered which illustrate the detriment that a woman might suffer in
case of denial. The Gerstein court interpreted this discussion as an enunciation of a
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A balancing test traditionally has been used for examining
the propriety of state abridgement of existent rights, not as a
means to determine the scope of such rights. By applying a balancing test at the inception as well as at the completion of its
analysis, the Gerstein court effectively placed a burden on a citizen to show the harm that would flow from judicial acquiescence
in governmental intrusion upon beliefs, thoughts, and emotions.
This result is clearly inconsistent with the values embodied in the
right to privacy and the cases which have explored the scope of
that right. For example, it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to argue credibly that if a state were allowed to prohibit the
viewing of pornographic films, the resultant harm to the individual would necessitate constitutional protection. Yet the Supreme
Court held in Stanley v. Georgia6 that this activity is protected
by the right of privacy.
As noted in Gerstein, a dilemma results from the confused
state of the law:3"
[E]ither (1) all fundamental rights apply to minors, but the
state may sometimes assert an interest sufficient to justify the
state action; or (2) minors do not necessarily have all of the
fundamental rights of adults.
The court in Gerstein purported not to choose between these two
standard to determine the existence of the privacy right. Although the language of the
Supreme Court in Roe can be taken to lend support to the Gerstein analysis, it is more
likely that the Supreme Court presented these variables in order to illustrate that the
alleged right is indeed fundamental and can therefore fall within the zone of protected
personal privacy. Though the distinction may seem trivial, the latter approach would be
more consistent with the intuitive type of analysis that the Court has used in considering
the nature of this right. Cf. note 30 infra and accompanying text. For example, the Court
has held that marriage and procreation are fundamental rights, being two of the basic
personal rights of man. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Court did not employ any standard in either Loving or
Skinner, but rather, seemed to base its holdings on its own perception of what is essential
to an orderly and successful society. The Court has found the right to be rooted in emanations of the penumbras of express guarantees in the Constitution, because the guarantees
specifically provided, basic to the constitutional scheme, would be incomplete without
these additional "peripheral rights." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-85 (1965).
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), the Supreme Court found the privacy right
established in Griswold to be applicable to single as well as married individuals. The
Court extended the protection of privacy over the individual's management of his or her
affairs because the matters at issue so fundamentally affected them. Id. at 453.
36. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Stanley was cited by the Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 152 (1973), in the course of its analysis of the right of privacy.
37. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 790 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Comment, Parental
Consent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1001, 1009 (1975).
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alternatives. The issue was approached, however, as one pertaining neither to the constitutional rights of children, nor to the
applicability of the fundamental right of privacy to minors, but
rather, to the scope of the particular right at issue-the decision
to terminate a pregnancy. Thus, the court implicitly accepted the
second approach to the issue; the court's inquiry was directed to
a determination of whether the particular right was applicable to
minors, rather than whether the state had an interest sufficient
to justify a limitation on the exercise of that right.
It is suggested that this case-by-case approach to issues such
as those raised by the parental consent requirement unnecessarily
confuses constitutional adjudication. Acceptance of the view that
all privacy rights apply to minors would not compromise the responsibilities of the state.
Children have been deprived of certain rights due to their
presumed lack of capacity to protect themselves from the dangers
to their health and welfare that are intrinsic to the exercise of
those rights. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth," a three-judge district court upheld a parental consent
requirement similar to that considered in Gerstein. The court in
Danforth reasoned that the consent requirement furthered compelling interests. This view was premised in part on the presumed
lack of capacity of minors to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy.39
The view that all persons who have not attained the designated age of majority lack the capacity to make a mature and
insightful judgment is rebutted by the approach taken with respect to the analogous questions which arise in other types of
litigation. For example, a minor's capacity to consent to medical
care depends on the same factors as those involved where the
right to privacy is at issue-the ability to apply one's intellect to
the decisionmaking process. Although some early cases held minors responsible for medical care rendered on their behalf," the
general rule at common law was that parental consent was a
38. 392 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D. Mo. 1975). For a discussion of Danforth see note 11 supra.
39. Id. at 1371. But see the opinion of Judge Webster, concurring in part and dissenting in part, where it is argued that minors who are sufficiently mature to make an intelligent decision cannot be constitutionally limited in their right to obtain an abortion. Id.
at 1376-77.
40. Huggins v. Wiseman, Carth. 110, 90 Eng. Rep. 669 (K.B. 1690); Dale v. Copping,
I Bulstr. 39, 80 Eng. Rep. 743 (K.B. 1610).
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prerequisite to the lawful delivery of medical services to a minor.4'
The law assumed that the parent would provide the necessary
insight and judgment; it refused to recognize the capacity of the
minor to make an informed decision, and construed any consent
given by the minor to be ineffective.

Not only does the law recognize parents' interest in the
health and well-being of a child, but an independent state interest in the rearing and welfare of the child has been consistently
upheld under the doctrine of parens patriae-"the inherent power
and authority of the state to provide protection of the person and
property of a person non sui juris."" This doctrine, originally
applied to the King of England and now used to designate the
state's sovereign power of guardianship over persons under a disa-

bility," has been upheld as a legitimate exercise of the state's
police power.45 It has authorized the classification of minors with
lunatics and idiots" as those who are "mentally undeveloped and
are unable to exercise a mature judgement."47
Although some authorities suggest that the exercise of this
authority is based upon "the knowledge that parental control or
guidance cannot always be provided,"" or is in fact absent,49 it is
clear that the state's power to act as parens patriae exists without
reference to such a finding. As the Supreme Court observed in
Prince v. Massachusetts:"
41. Rogers v. Sells, 178 Okla. 103, 61 P.2d 1018 (1936); Browning v. Hoffman, 90 W.
Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922); cf. Zoski v. Gaines, 271 Mich. 1, 260 N.W. 99, 102 (1935).
See generally U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, FAMILY PLANNING, CONTRACEPTION,
AND VOLUNTARY STERILIZATION: AN ANALYSIS OF LAWS AND POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES,

EACH STATE AND JURISDICTION 70 (HEW Pub. No. HSA 74-16001, 1971) [hereinafter cited
as FAMILY PLANNING].

42. See Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental
Consent, 60 VA. L. REV. 305, 309 (1974).
43. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 179 P.2d 57, 64 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947); see
Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972); Mormon Church v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 57-58 (1890); Louisville N.O. &T. Ry. v. Blythe, 69 Miss. 839, 11 So. 111, 113
(1892).
44. In re Turner, 94 Kan. 115, 145 P. 871, 872 (1915).
45. See People v. Ewer, 141 N.Y. 129, 36 N.E. 4 (1894).
46. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (dicta); Fontain v. Ravenel,
58 U.S. (17 How.) 369, 393 (1854) (Taney, J., concurring). See also Morman Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 58 (1890).
47. Warner Bros. Pictures v. Brodel, 179 P.2d 57, 64 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1947).
48. People v. Kahan, 15 N.Y.2d 311, 312, 206 N.E.2d 333, 334, 258 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392
(1965)(Fuld, J., concurring).
49. Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905).
50. 321 U.S. 158, 166-68 (1944).
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It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and
freedom include preparation of obligations the state can neither
supply nor hinder. [Citation omitted] And it is in recognition
of this that these decisions have respected the private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter.
But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public
interest . . . . Acting to guard the general interest in youth's
well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting
the child's labor and in many other ways ...
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon
the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this
against impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range
of selection. [Footnotes and citations omitted.]
The many broad pronouncements of courts which grant states
broader power over the affairs of children than over those of
adults," clearly look to the preservation of this well-established
state interest.
Gradually, the force of the parental consent rule has been
limited with the development of the emancipated,5 2 partially
emancipated,"5 and mature minor" exceptions. These exceptions
operate to enable some minors to validly consent to medical treatment. Underlying these modifications55 of the common law rule
51. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 638 (1968); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944); Bookcase, Inc., v. Broderick, 18 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 218 N.E.2d
668, 671, 271 N.Y.S.2d 947, 952 (1966).
52. The emancipated minor exception is based on the view that when parental authority over the management of a child's activities is relinquished, the child has assumed
the responsibilities of an adult and should, therefore, be granted the necessary legal
authority to act on his or her own behalf. See Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 2d 16, 431 P.2d
719, 723 (1967); FAMILY PLANNING, supra note 41, at 71.
53. See, e.g., Bach v. Long Island Jewish Hosp., 49 Misc. 2d 207, 267 N.Y.S.2d 289
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966); American Prods. Co. v. Vullwick, 7 Wash. 2d 246, 26768, 109 P.2d 570, 579 (1941).
54. The mature minor exception is based upon the premise that a child who possesses
a sufficient understanding of the risks and nature of the procedures involved is not in need
of protection by others. See, e.g., Younts v. St. Francis Hosp., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d 330
(1970); Bakker v. Welsh, 144 Mich. 632, 108 N.W. 94 (1906); Grannum v. Berard, 70 Wash.
304, 422 P.2d 812 (1967); FAMILY PLANNING, supra note 41, at 72.
The Gersteincourt noted that if the state were concerned with protecting the interests
of minors who lacked capacity to make a mature judgment in seeking an abortion, it could
have included a mature minor exception, Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 792 (5th Cir.
1975).
55. For a discussion of statutes recognizing the partial emancipation doctrine see
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is the policy determination that some minors do, in fact, possess
the necessary capacity to make an informed decision with respect
to medical treatment. Thus, the consent requirement is abandoned when it no longer furthers the state's interest and serves
only to restrict minors' access to health care.
Factors weighed in evaluating a minor's capacity are: "age,
intelligence, maturity, training, experience, economic independence or lack thereof, general conduct as an adult and freedom
from the control of parents."5 6 The sufficiency of a minor's consent may depend on his or her "ability to understand and comprehend the nature of the surgical procedure, the risks involved and
the probability of attaining the desired results in the light of the
circumstances which attend. 57 Thus, once a minor acquires these
traits, the necessity of requiring parental consent for the youth's
protection disappears:"
In general, the evolution of exceptions to the parental consent
requirement reflects an increasing sensitivity to the child as a
person; the focus of the exceptions has shifted from emphasis on
bodily integrity (emergency) to judicial recognition of de facto
majority (emancipation) to concern over the characteristics and
mental capabilities of the minor (maturity).
Note, The Minor's Right to Abortion and the Requirement of Parental Consent, 60 VA.
L. REV. 305, 311 & n.37 (1974). For the statutes recognizing the emancipation doctrine
see FAMILY PLANNING, supra note 41, at 80 & n.23. For an example of the codification of
the doctrine see Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3 (1972).
In addition to the exceptions described in the text, the law has waived the consent
requirement in two other areas. In certain emergencies the consent of a parent is not
required since it might cause more harm to the child than had the minor been able to
obtain the treatment without first securing consent. See, e.g., Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich.
122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); FAmIY PLANNING, supra note 41, at 71, 80 & nn.8-19 (listing
statutes codifying the emergency exception). Courts have also ordered medical service for
neglected minors, realizing that requiring parental consent in the case of an uninterested
or ignorant parent, or in the case of a parent who withholds consent unreasonably will also
serve to cause harm to the child. See FAMmY PLANNING, supra note 41, at 73; Baker, Court
Ordered Non-Emergency Medical Care for Infants, 18 CLEv.-MAR. L. REv. 296, 298 n.12
(1969).
Although the exceptions are primarily intended to liberate minors in the management
of some of their affairs, these doctrines concurrently protect physicians from tort liability.
See, e.g., Jackovach v. Yocum, 212 Iowa 914, 237 N.W. 444 (1931).
56. Smith v. Seibly, 72 Wash. 16, 431 P.2d 719, 723 (1967). See also Rowan v. Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 741 (1970)(Brennan, J., concurring).
57. Younts v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 205 Kan. 292, 469 P.2d
330, 337 (1970); cf. Annot. 139 A.L.R. 1370 (1942).
58. Comment, ParentalConsent Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The
Contraceptive Controversy, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1001, 1003-04 (1975).
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Just as case and statutory law regarding minors' rights to
medical treatment were modified in response to contemporary
realities, constitutional issues should be resolved with a sensitivity to the psychological and social maturity of many of those who
are legally still "infants." 59 The only rational distinction between
a minor's and an adult's right to privacy is the possible inability
of the former to make the kind of insightful judgment upon which
the grant of this right is premised." As noted above,6' the law has
recognized that a blanket presumption of this incapacity of persons younger than an arbitrary age of majority is inappropriate.
Although the state, as parens patriae, may exercise its sovereign
power to act as guardian of those persons under a disability or
those who are mentally undeveloped and are unable to exercise a
mature judgment over their affairs,62 it no longer possesses that
power when the disability which originally necessitated the protection is cured. At that point the formerly disabled should not
suffer any further abridgement of their rights than do other persons protected by the Constitution.
Many recent decisions lend support to the approach suggested. In State v. Koome,6 3 the Washington Supreme Court
found a statute unconstitutional which conditioned the right of
minor, unmarried females to obtain an abortion on the consent
of either a parent or guardian. The court presumed that a minor
possessed the right: 4
Prima facie, the constitutional rights of minors, including the
right of privacy, are coextensive with those of adults. Where
minors' rights have been held subject to curtailment by the state
in excess of that permissible in the case of adults it has been
because some peculiar state interest existed in the regulation
and protection of children, not because the rights themselves are
of some inferior kind.
59. The Constitution was intended to serve as a mere skeleton of the law-the extensions and limitations of rights, powers, and duties protected in it are to be formulated with
the passage of time and experience. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 489-93
(1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949). Limitation of
minors' rights for the purpose of their protection might have been justifiable at one point
in time. Changes in the social climate, however, such as the earlier maturity of children,
may render that extra guidance unnecessary.
60. Cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169 (1944).
61, See notes 55-58 supra and accompanying text.
62. See notes 44-47 supra.
63. 84 Wash. 2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975).
64. Id, at 263. See Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 937 (1970); Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 202-03 (D. Utah 1973).
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The issues were thus limited to whether the state's asserted interest was compelling and whether the statute was rationally related
to such a purpose. 5
Similiarly, in PopulationService Internationalv. Wilson,6 a
United States district court found that the claim that a New York
statute" which prevented the sale of non-prescription contraceptives to persons under 16 presented a substantial constitutional
question. In addressing the merits, the court did not presume
minors to be lacking any fundamental rights. Rather, it looked to
the state's interest in abridging the right at issue, and the burden
it must satisfy if the restriction were to be upheld:68
[I]f the exercise of a "fundamental" right is involved, it may
be regulated only to the extent that regulation is justified by a
"compelling" state interest ...
[I]t is clear that the mere fact that a person is a minor does
not except him from the protections of the Constitution ...
Therefore, an immediate question . . . is whether the State's
asserted interest in limiting teenage extra-marital activity is of
sufficient magnitude to justify the burden placed on these individuals' right to privacy.
Erznoznic v. City of Jacksonville" involved a Jacksonville,
Florida, ordinance which made it a public nuisance for a drivein movie theater to present films which contained nudity when
the screen was visible from a public street or place. The United
65. "State restrictions on fundamental freedoms must be narrowly drawn to conform
to the legitimate state interests to be furthered .... " State v. Koome, 84 Wash. 2d 901,
530 P.2d 260, 265 (1975). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
66. 383 F. Supp. 543 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
67. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6811(8) (McKINNEY 1972). The statute also prohibited the sale
of such contraceptives by anyone other than licensed pharmacists and absolutely banned
any advertisement for or display of contraceptives.
68. 383 F. Supp. 543, 548-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). When the case came before the threejudge court, the statute was declared unconstitutional since it did not bear a substantial
relation to the state's interest. Population Serv. Int'l v. Wilson, 398 F. Supp. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court did find, however, that each of the provisions of the statute
under attack burdened the exercise of "the right to privacy." Thus, the court impliedly
recognized minors' possession of the right. But cf. Bykofsky v. Borough, 401 F. Supp. 1242
(M.D. Pa. 1975), where the district court upheld the constitutionality of a nocturnal
curfew imposed on minors under the age of 18. In rejecting the plaintiff's equal protection
argument, the court held that the rational basis test, and not the compelling state interest
test, was "the proper yardstick" to use in determining the statute's constitutionality. The
curfew did not infringe on a fundamental right, nor did it create a suspect classification.
Id. at 2120.
69. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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States Supreme Court held that the state's interest in the protection of children was insufficient to sustain this use of the city's
police power. The restriction was not directed against sexually
explicit nudity or otherwise limited, and thus, was broader than
permissible. Justice Powell, speaking for the majority, stated
that:70
[Mlinors are entitled to a significant measure of first amendment protection [citation omitted], and only in relatively
narrow and well-defined circumstances may government bar
public dissemination of protected material to them ...
. . . In most circumstances, the values protected by the
First Amendment are no less applicable when government seeks
to control the flow of information to minors.
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that careful scrutiny
must be applied to statuteg which purport to protect children by
abridging a fundamental right. The Court insisted that a state
premise an exercise of its power on a proper determination of a
child's lack of capacity in a precisely delineated area. The state's
power is based on disability and the resultant need for protection.
Analogous issues are raised by litigation involving the rights
of the mentally ill since they are classified with minors as persons
non sui juris.7' The state as parens patriae may confine the mentally ill due to their inability to care for themselves.72 Recently,
however, the United States Supreme Court in O'Connor v.
Donaldson7 3 defined the extent of this power of the state:74
[A] state cannot constitutionally confine without more a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.
The court reasoned that the exercise of the police power was not
justified since the plaintiff was not dangerous to the general wel70. Id. at 212, 214 (emphasis added). The Court also noted:
"[A] state may permissibly determine that at least in some precisely delineated areas, a child-like someone in a captive audience-is not possessed of that
full capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First Amendment guarantees." [Emphasis added.]
Id. at 2275 n.11, quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
71. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
72. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2497 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2494.
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fare, and that parens patriae could not be a source of state power
since the plaintiff had the capacity to care for himself. It held
narrowly that the liberty of such an individual cannot be restricted.
In his concurring opinion in Donaldson,Chief Justice Burger
stressed the fact that the Court did not grant a constitutional
right to treatment. 5 The Chief Justice identified other possible
justifications for confinement and concluded that the absence of
treatment does not preclude the protection of the person non sui
juris. Thus, the Chief Justice underscored the principle that the
state must at least protect the individual if it exercises its power
as parens patriae. If the state cannot prove a disability it is without power to restrict the individual's freedom.
Conclusion
Poe v. Gerstein dealt with the competing constitutional interests of the child and state. As a starting point, the child must
be entitled to all fundamental rights under the Constitution. The
state as parens patriae may employ its police power to protect the
child who lacks the capacity upon which conferral of the right in
issue is based. Consequently, the state may assert its interest in
the child as well as its concurrent interest in preserving parental
guidance by providing for parental control of those affairs which
the child cannot adequately manage for him or herself.
The right to privacy is fundamental; the protection of the
right is rooted in the very essence of the constitutional scheme.
76
It is well settled that:
[W]here fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may
not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of
a proper state purpose.
To place the burden on the minor of establishing the applicability to him or her of that which is universally recognized as
being applicable to others, without first requiring a clear justification by the state, is to read into the Constitution too extensive
75. Id. at 2496.
76. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring);
accord, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 196 (1964) (racial classification); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)
(freedom of association).
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a grant of power to the state. To shift the burden by requiring the
state to demonstrate a compelling interest for the restriction,
would sufficiently protect its interest in providing for the health
and well-being of the child without unnecessarily abridging the
latter's rights. Indeed, if the state can substantiate a lack of capacity of those who fall within the reach of the statute, protection
of such individuals may well be upheld as a legitimate exercise
of the parens patriae power. Statutes affecting constitutional
rights, however, must be drawn with precision 77 and "must be
'tailored' to serve their legitimate objectives.""8 Factors 79 that
serve to distinguish incompetent and thus disabled minors from
those who possess the capacity to care for themselves should be
incorporated into state statutes that tend to restrict some aspect
of the fundamental right of privacy of minors as a class.
In the case of an abortion statute, consultation with an individual's physician or psychiatrist would serve as an impartial
tribunal for the determination of the individual's ability to deal
with the situation without the guidance of parent or guardian.
The physician may be given the authority to evaluate the extent
of the minor's possession of personality traits that serve to distinguish her as a competent youth. Guidelines can be provided
77. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
438 (1963).
78. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 631 (1969).
79. See notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.
80. Cf. N.Y, DoM. REL. LAW § 7(1) (McKinney 1964). The statute provides that:
A marriage is void from the time its nullity is declared by a court of competent jurisdiction if either party thereto:
(1) Is under the age of legal consent, which is eighteen years, provided that
such nonage shall not of itself constitute an absolute right to the annulment of
such marriage, but such annulment shall be in the discretion of the court which
shall take into consideration all the facts and circumstances surrounding such
marriage.
The statute has been interpreted to uphold marital status "when the underaged persons
involved show willingness and capacity for enduring marital life and for the building of a
family unit." Short v. Hotaling, 32 Misc. 2d 933, 934-35, 225 N.Y.S.2d 53, 55 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1962). The court observed that:
[M]aturity of body alone is no sure foundation for a satisfactory marriage.
What is needed is maturity of both body and mind, which quite often does occur
in the case of a youthful couple while sometimes absent in people of age. Where
it is present, as it is here, though it be a marriage without parental consent, the

marriage deserves to be sustained.
Id. This approach supports the analysis suggested in this note; the capacity of the minors
involved, not the accidental circumstance of their age is determinative of their ability to
exercise the right to marry. Once the ability is found to exist, the right is shielded from
state interference.
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by a well-tailored law, but courts must be wary of broad statutes
which refer to minors as a class and presume incapacity without
providing for a case-by-case evaluation.
Arthur David Sanders
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